

ROLL OF HONOR.

It is very gratifying for men and women of to-day to find an ancestor's name on the pension roll of the Revolution. It will be equally gratifying in the future for a man's descendants to find that he was on the pension roll of the War of Rebellion.

ONE DOLLAR A YEAR.



Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac

A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the Close of the War, 1861-1865.

By WILLIAM SWINTON.

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CHANGE OF BASE.

The Army makes a skillful sweep across the James, and begins the long-continued investment of Petersburg—Extension of the Left Flank to Cut the Rebel Lines of Supply.

The determination of Gen. Grant to transfer the army by a flank march, to the south side of the James River, involved considerations of a wholly different order than those concerned in the repeated turning movements which he had made to dislodge Lee from the entrenched positions held by him. There were simply maneuvers of grand tactics, delicate indeed in their nature, but they did not carry the army away from its line of operations, nor from the defensive lines as regards Washington, which it all the time covered. The resolution to cross the James necessitated the total abandonment of that center of action which aimed, while operating against the enemy offensively, to directly defend the National Capital.

Now, although in the defense of places, it is frequently more efficacious to assume a line of operation that seems to abandon the point to be guarded and deliver it up to the enemy, than to place one's self directly in front of it, it must be borne in mind that Gen. Grant was acting under an Administration that was not only incapable of appreciating such considerations, which indeed belong to the higher part of war, but an Administration that was from political motives, strongly opposed to a removal of the army from the overland line of advance against Richmond. Moreover, the operation was in itself one of great delicacy, a change of base being announced by the foremost master of war "the ablest maneuver taught by military art." (1)

Gen. Grant manifested as much moral firmness in adopting a line of action which adverse though it was to the wishes of his Government, he felt to be prescribed by the highest military considerations, as he showed ability in executing this difficult operation. The measure itself was not only entirely conformable to the true principles of war, but its execution reflects high credit on the commander, and merits the closest study.

GRANT WENT TO THE JAMES. Immediately after the battle of Cold Harbor, the Ninth Corps, then holding the extreme right of the line, had been withdrawn from its position and posted between the Fifth Corps, which then became the right of the line, and the Eighteenth. On the 6th, the Fifth Corps was retired and massed in rear of the center. The Ninth Corps then became again the right of the line. On the 7th, the Second Corps, then forming the left of the line, being stretched to the Chickahominy, the Fifth was transferred to that flank to extend it as far as Dispatch Station on the York River Railroad. At this date, two divisions of cavalry under Sheridan were sent to destroy more effectively the Central Railroad.


By the gradual refusal of the right flank and development of the left, the army was placed within an easy march of the line crossing the Chickahominy. Warren's Corps being but 10 miles from Long Bridge. On the night of the 12th of June the movement to the James was begun. Warren, preceding the advance, crossed the river, covering all the routes by which the enemy might come down from Richmond to observe or disturb the movement; and under cover of his army, the whole army marched toward the James.

Lee, of course, discovered the withdrawal on the morning of the 13th. He, however, made no attempt to follow up, but moved toward Richmond. During the afternoon, a body of infantry came down the New Market road; but finding Warren's force in line of battle, it made no attack, contenting itself with intruding a slight. It is probable that this movement of Warren deceived Lee as to Grant's actual purpose, and caused him to anticipate a direct advance on Richmond by the river route. But, meantime, the army had reached the James below Harrison's Landing, and was prepared to pass to the south side. Here a considerable delay was caused by the nonarrival of the pontoon bridges; (2) but means of transport being at hand, Hancock's Corps was ferried across at Wilson's Landing, and landed on the south bank at Windmill Point. During the night of the 14th, the pontoon bridge was laid across the James at Douthett's, a short distance below Hancock's point of passage. (3) By noon of the 16th the whole army was on the south side of the James.

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1. Napoleon: Memoirs, vol. iii, p. 203. 2. It turned out that the pontoon bridge for the wagon train over the Chickahominy at Cole's Ferry was too short by half its length; so that the army pontoon train was sent to piece it out. By this means a very remote risk of losing a wagon train, the commander ran the very positive risk of losing Petersburg.

3. This bridge was a notable achievement in pontoon engineering, being over 3,000 feet in length, and the channel bottoms anchored in 13 fathoms of water. It was begun during the forenoon of the 14th and was completed by midnight. The site for the bridge was selected and the approaches prepared by Brig.-Gen. Weitzel, Chief Engineer, Department of Virginia and North Carolina; and the bridge was laid under direction of Brig.-Gen. Benham.



OPERATIONS AROUND RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG.

and pushed forward, on the morning of the 15th, toward Petersburg, distant seven miles. The advanced column, in three columns—Kautz, with the cavalry to threaten the line of fortifications near the Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad, and at the same time protect the left flank of the infantry; Hinks' Division, in rear of Kautz, to take position across the Jordan's Point road, as near as possible to the enemy's works; Brooks' Division to follow Hinks, and take position on his right; Martindale's Division, on the extreme right, to proceed, by the river road, and strike the City Point Railroad. (5)

After an advance of two miles, the cavalry struck a line of rifle-trenches near the City Point Railroad, defended by infantry and armed with a light battery. Upon this, Kautz was withdrawn to the left, further advance was made, and after a march of a couple of miles, the force brought up in front of the fortifications enveloping Petersburg from the south. It was noon before all the troops could be brought up. (6)

On reconnoitering the position, it was found to be defended by a strong line of redans, and connected, though incompletely, by very formidable rifle-pits; while the approach was over a broad low valley perfectly swept by the artillery of the works, and cut up by ditches and ravines. In the center the line formed a salient, covered by a powerful profiled work, heavily flanked by earthworks and rifle-trenches on each flank.

4. This attempt was made on the 16th of May, when the Army of the Potomac began its change of base. The expedition was made by an infantry force under Gen. Gilmore, and a cavalry force under Gen. Kautz. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in toward the town, but was forced to retire. Gen. Gilmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one.—Grant: Report of Operations, p. 10.

5. Smith: Report of Operations against Petersburg. It may be observed that this statement of the time of the arrival of the column before the fortifications of Petersburg is at variance with the statement of Gen. Grant, who asserts that Gen. Smith "confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight."—Report, p. 12. The statement above made is based on the official reports of Gen. Smith and his division commanders. Without inquiring too curiously in regard to this matter, it is enough to say that the assertion of the Lieutenant-General is not in conformity with the facts ascertained from the morning of the 15th. Thus, it was some time after daylight before the column began to move from its point of passage of the Appomattox at Broadway. It was then brought to a halt by the line of rifle-pits already mentioned and it was after 9 o'clock before it got under way again. It is probably this delay which is alluded to by Gen. Grant when he speaks of "confronting the enemy near Petersburg." Moreover, this affair caused a further delay: for the carrying of these trenches had thrown Gen. Hinks out of his assigned position on the left, and as he knew the country better than any one present, it was necessary to halt the column until he could move by the flank to his place. The Petersburg fortifications between 10 and 11, but it was 3 before the force was up and deployed in position.

Gen. Smith had been informed that the fortifications were such that "cavalry could ride over them"—a representation that did not turn out to be justified by experience; for Kautz, who, with his mounted division, essayed to work his way round on the left, found himself completely stopped by a heavy fire, and in front the approaches were discovered to be so covered by the play of artillery from the fortifications, that from every point on which Smith attempted to place batteries to silence the enemy's fire the guns were speedily driven off. (7) It could not be detected that any heavy force of infantry was making the fortification; but it was not judged probable that so considerable an artillery force would be there without support.

ATTACK BY SKIRMISHERS.

After surveying the ground and making his dispositions, which consumed all the afternoon, Gen. Smith, thinking that the assault of the works by column would, from the fire of the enemy's guns, cost too great a sacrifice, determined to try a heavy line of skirmishers. Accordingly, toward 7 p. m., a column of (1) Hinks, of the left, Brooks in the center, and Martindale on the right (the rest of whose command awaited in line of battle to follow up any success), and under a sharp infantry fire, carried the line. Brooks captured the works on the salient, with several hundred prisoners and four guns, which, double-shot with canister, had been kept in the front column expected column of Hinks, on the left, and Martindale on the right, followed up the success, the colored troops carrying four of the redoubts with their artillery.

Thus auspiciously opened the operations on the south side of the James: the lines of Petersburg—defended, as it proved, by an inconsiderable force, and by local militia made up of boys and old men who were not carried. But as it was almost dark when the operations I have described closed, the troops rested on their arms in the works gained, without the possession either of Petersburg or the line of the Appomattox—an event whence sprang a long list of woes.

UNHAPPY RESULTS OF UNNECESSARY DELAY AT OUTER LINES.

During the day on which these events in front of Petersburg were occurring, the Army of the Potomac still continued the laborious process of filing across the James, and at the same time Lee was passing his army to the south side above, near Drury's Bluff. By the morning of the 15th, however, the same morning on which Smith moved toward Petersburg, Hancock's Corps had been all ferried to the south side of the James, and it would have been a simple matter to have directed that corps on Petersburg, to unite with Smith's command. Had this been done, and on which, the line of the Appomattox would have been in possession of the Union force before night. The circumstance by which it failed to be done forms one of the most curious episodes in this campaign, and on which, as I would seem as though Gen. Grant expected that Petersburg would fall an easy prey to Butler's force; for he left both Gen. Meade and Gen. Hancock wholly unaware of his design, and on which, the capture of that place. Hancock was directed to remain at the point at which he had crossed till rations, which Gen. Butler was to send, should be received and issued, and then to move in the direction of Petersburg, and "take up a position where the City Point Railroad crosses Harrison's Creek." After waiting till about 10 o'clock in the forenoon, and finding that the expected rations did not arrive, he ordered the forward march of his column toward his assigned position on Harrison's Creek—a position which was marked on a map furnished him from headquarters, and on which, as indicated on the map, was miles away, and actually inside the enemy's lines.

At length, at 5:30 in the afternoon, while pushing forward to reach this mythical objective, Hancock received a dispatch from Gen. Grant, directing him to use all haste in getting up to the assistance of Gen. Smith, who, as the paper stated, had been driven from Petersburg (8). Hancock's outer works in front of that place.

7. "Wherever I went on the line, I found a heavy cross-fire of artillery from the enemy. The few artillery positions I could find I tried to get our guns to open from; but they were always driven in by the superior fire of the enemy's batteries."—Smith: Report of Operations before Petersburg.

8. The determination to attack in the manner above described was formed by Gen. Grant, but a day or two before, an hour occurred here, owing to the fact that "the Chief of Artillery had, upon his own responsibility, taken his guns to the rear, and snatched the horses to water."—Smith: Report of Operations before Petersburg. Now, as an interval of five or six hours had passed between the time of Smith's arrival and his resolution to assault, it may be a point of inquiry why he was doing during this time. Gen. Grant makes this delay the ground of implied censure. "For some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand," he says, "Gen. Smith, who was ready to assault the enemy's main line until near sundown." Now, although this censure partially rests on the ground that Gen. Smith reached the position "before daylight," a very different view may be taken, if it be remembered that the fact that he did not arrive until noon—there may still remain a residue of blame, Gen. Smith might possibly have assaulted several hours before he actually did, had he chosen to take the responsibility of doing so without reconnaissance. It is likely enough that Sheridan, had he been present, instead of Smith, would have done so. But this involves no foundation for charge of dereliction of duty—it is only a question of choice between two different methods of action—the method which, taking great risks, may either lose greatly or greatly gain, and that which works by methodical procedure.

9. As the circumstances attending the noncapture of Petersburg are likely to give rise to much discussion, I shall here set forth with more particularity the facts as concern the march of Hancock's column. The waiting for rations, which caused a delay of several hours during the morning of the 15th, can not be regarded as having any important bearing on the question, seeing that Gen. Hancock would not have waited had he known that Petersburg was to have been taken. The column was put in motion at 10:30 a. m., and the distance from Windmill Point, whence Hancock's Corps started, is about 20 miles. Birney's Division had the advance, followed by the Prince George Courthouse road, while Barlow's Division moved by the Old Courthouse road. The leading division was conducted on the former road by the Chief of Staff to Gen. Hancock, who was furnished with a map on which the position to be reached behind Harrison's Creek was marked. But the map proved to be utterly worthless—the only road laid down on it being a wretchedly bad way. The staff-officer, however, bestirred himself to obtain information of the country from negro guides, and this being communicated to Gen. Hancock, he judged that the speediest way to get to the position was to direct to occupy would be to turn the head of the column from the Prince George Courthouse road toward Old Court-

This order, which was the first intimation Gen. Hancock had received that Petersburg was to be attacked that day, or that Gen. Smith was operating against it, (10) met him when he was some miles distant from Petersburg. He immediately hastened forward his command, but was unable to join Gen. Smith till after the attack had been made; and, although he then proved his troops to Gen. Smith, that officer had determined to suspend operations for the night, judging it wiser to hold securely what had been won, than by attempting to reach the bridges, to risk the loss of all the gain. (11)

GRANT WAS RESPONSIBLE. Whether Gen. Smith, in this acting, did ill or well, may be a question; but there can be no question as to who is really responsible for the failure to take Petersburg. This is no other than the Lieutenant-General himself. (12) Yet, as the event proved, it was fortunate it was not taken. The resolution on the part of the Confederates to try out the issue of the war there, saved the Union army an excellent line of operations on the James, and the fact that Petersburg had been taken from Richmond to the interior, thus greatly complicating matters.

During the morning of the 15th, the van of Lee's army reached the town, and men of a very different mettle from the crude soldiers to whom its defense had been entrusted silently deployed in line of battle. The morning it was found that a new line of works had been thrown up around the town, defended by a large force already present, which was constantly reinforced by the rapidly-arriving Confederate corps. The morning it was found that a new line of works had been thrown up around the town, defended by a large force already present, which was constantly reinforced by the rapidly-arriving Confederate corps.

In its strategic relations to Richmond, Petersburg may be defined as the great thrust forward on the flank of the Confederate Capital. The great lines of supply for an army covering Richmond—the Lynchburg Railroad, James River Canal and Danville Railroad—run into that city from a westerly and southwesterly direction. But Petersburg, securely held, easily holds off at arm's-length any force threatening the communications of the Confederate Capital. It is distant 22 miles south from Richmond, with which city it is connected by the Petersburg & Richmond Railroad, while by means of the Lynchburg Railroad it taps the great Danville line, and from the point of receiving the Weldon and the Norfolk Railroads. In case it should lose the two latter, as would be likely if assailed by a force following the line of operations of the Union army, there remained the two former, which from their situation are almost unassailable.

Invested with this value, Petersburg could not fail to be a possession coveted with equal eagerness by each combatant. This was indeed the case: Grant had designed to seize it before the Confederate army could join the meager local force left for its defense; and Lee, as soon as the transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the south side of the James had plainly declared his rival's purpose, drew his columns also to the south bank and hurried them forward to Petersburg, where they began to arrive during the hours of darkness that followed the assault on the evening of the 15th of June.

How nearly Petersburg then fell a prize to Smith's coup de main has already been seen. Had not night intervened, the city a Confederate force so considerable as to insure that its capture would cost a severe struggle.

The morning of the 16th found on the Union side present before Petersburg no more than the two corps of Smith and Hancock: the remaining corps were distant several hours' march. The center of the line of redans enveloping the city from the south had been penetrated the night before, and the positions then gained were securely held by the Union force. But the Confederates clung tenaciously to a hastily-improvised line close in the rear of the lost point; and this on its left flank ran into portions of the original system of earthworks, then by a crossroad set behind Harrison's Creek. Accordingly, Birney's and Gibbon's divisions were turned to the right, leaving the Prince George Courthouse road within six miles of Petersburg before 3 p. m. At 5:30 p. m., as the column neared Old Courthouse, the dispatch from Gen. Grant, directing him to go to the assistance of Smith, was received. Fortunately, this came to hand just as the head of Birney's Division was passing a country road leading directly toward Petersburg, and the column of Smith and Hancock's troops was turned in that direction, arriving at Smith's position as the assault was over. No time had been lost on the march during the day, and the direction of Hancock's non-arrival at an earlier hour is due exclusively to the fact that he was not directed on Petersburg, and had no intimation, until between 5 and 6 p. m., that it was to be attacked. Had he been informed he could readily have joined Smith early in the afternoon, by marching directly toward Petersburg. The best hours of the day were spent in marching by an inconspicuous route, and the delay in the position which, as it was not in existence as described, could naturally not be found. With these facts, which are of official authenticity, it will not be difficult to judge who is responsible for the noncapture of Petersburg. As Lieut.-Gen. Grant states that he "threw forward the Army of the Potomac, as rapidly as could be accomplished," (Report, p. 12), and the manner in which he threw it forward is sufficiently manifest in the fact that neither Gen. Meade nor Gen. Hancock knew that Petersburg was to be attacked even, I believe, until the morning of the 16th. The responsibility of this discrepancy to those better equipped for the task.

10. "I desire to say here that the messages from Lieut.-Gen. Grant, and from Gen. Smith, which I received between 5 and 6 p. m., were received by me, and only intimation I had that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. Up to that hour I had not been notified from any source that I was expected to assist Gen. Smith."—Smith: Report of Operations before Petersburg.

11. It will probably always remain one of those questions respecting which men are having a hearing, when the question is put in motion at 10:30 a. m., and the distance from Windmill Point, whence Hancock's Corps started, is about 20 miles. Birney's Division had the advance, followed by the Prince George Courthouse road, while Barlow's Division moved by the Old Courthouse road. The leading division was conducted on the former road by the Chief of Staff to Gen. Hancock, who was furnished with a map on which the position to be reached behind Harrison's Creek was marked. But the map proved to be utterly worthless—the only road laid down on it being a wretchedly bad way. The staff-officer, however, bestirred himself to obtain information of the country from negro guides, and this being communicated to Gen. Hancock, he judged that the speediest way to get to the position was to direct to occupy would be to turn the head of the column from the Prince George Courthouse road toward Old Court-

12. There is on file in the archives of the army a paper bearing this indorsement: "Gen. Meade: 'Had Gen. Hancock or myself known that Petersburg was to be attacked, Petersburg would have fallen.'"

Tribune.

WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, JULY 7, 1904.

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A Second Reminder to Married Soldiers.

It does not follow, as a matter of course, if a man was a soldier, even if he is a pensioner, that it will be an easy matter for his widow to get a pension. As a matter of fact, widows' claims are unnecessarily delayed, and in some cases never allowed for lack of evidence, which the husband, usually, could have supplied during his lifetime.

This important matter has been discussed, from time to time, in the columns of The National Tribune, and has been made the subject of orders by Commanders-in-Chief of the Grand Army, but every appeal heretofore was deficient in one essential particular: no safe and permanent place was suggested for the custody of the information.

The National Tribune Co., in a practical way, proposes to supply this deficiency. In a fireproof room, in its own building, and under lock and key to insure privacy, it will care for such papers and information until such time as they may be needed, even if such time is many years distant. The National Tribune Co. is incorporated. Having a perpetual existence, the death of the present managers of the Company will not disturb the business or change the custody

of the papers. No safer place in the world can be found for the purpose.

But The National Tribune will go further in this commendable work. It will assist in getting in shape the proofs and information required. The first step for every comrade is to answer the few simple questions that are printed below under the heading "Preliminary Report." This report will disclose the case and enable The National Tribune to complete all the proof required.

There will be no charge whatever for this service, but it will be expected of every comrade that he will call the attention of at least one other married comrade to this matter and influence the other comrade to do likewise. No other missionary work among comrades who are not subscribers to The National Tribune will not learn of this important service if subscribers do not call their attention to it. Extra papers will be sent for distribution upon request.

Comrades who attend to this matter promptly will be taking the best possible step toward securing for their widows the higher rate of pension: that is, \$12 a month instead of \$8.

Preliminary Report

To aid my widow, if I leave one, in getting her pension.

NOTE.—This report is short, and can be easily written out on letter or legal cap paper. This course avoids cutting the paper. Be sure to write the names and dates clearly and distinctly. When report is ready mail it to R. W. Shoppell, Attorney, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C.

Name _____, 1904.

Soldier's Name _____, P. O. _____

State _____ I was in the service from _____ day of _____, 186____, to the _____ day of _____, 186____, as a _____ (give rank, company and regiment.)

and was honorably discharged at _____, on the _____ day of _____, 186____. Are you a pensioner? _____ (Yes or no.) At what rate? \$_____ per month.

Were you pensioned under the old law or the new? _____ (The new law is the act of June 27, 1890.)

What wounds, diseases or disabilities, if any, are written on your pension certificate? _____

I was married to _____ on the _____ day of _____, 18____, by _____ (give name of clergyman or person officiating.)

At marriage my age was _____ Her age was _____

Is there a public or church record of this marriage? _____

Were either of you previously married? _____

Remarks: _____ (If remarks are of considerable length they should be written on a separate sheet of paper.)

All About the New "Age" Order.

THE LAW OF JUNE 27, 1890, AND THE NEW "AGE" ORDER.

The laws of June 27, 1890, and May 9, 1900, provide for a pension, according to degree of disability, from \$0 to \$12 per month for any soldier of the War of the Rebellion who served 90 days and was honorably discharged.

The new "AGE" Order simply says that any claimant who has arrived at the age of 62, or 65, or 68, or 70, is presumed without further proof (and, inferentially, without examination) to be suffering disability sufficient to warrant \$6 a month pension at age of 62; \$8 a month at age of 65; \$10 a month at age of 68 and \$12 a month at age of 70.

To Those Who Have Never Applied for Pension.

The estimate is that there are 162,000 soldiers of the War of the Rebellion who have never applied for pension, and that the majority of them are over 62 years of age. We urge upon these comrades that it is their duty to apply. If many are so well-to-do that they do not need it, they can apply the money to help those who do need it. A pensioner contributes to the prosperity of his neighborhood. Every dollar he draws and puts into circulation serves the whole community before it finally goes back to the Treasury. The pension list is really a Roll of Honor. Under this "AGE" Order an application can be made that, in most cases, does not involve examination, which probably removes a feature that was objectionable to many.

HANCOCK'S DILATORY SUBORDINATE.

But although by the morning of the 16th Lee had succeeded in throwing into Petersburg a considerable body of troops, it was outnumbered by the Union force present, which was reinforced more rapidly than the Confederates. The situation, therefore, was not even yet of a nature to forbid the hope of securing Petersburg, or at least securing all the commanding ground before the heavy Confederate reinforcements should arrive. Gen. Hancock, to whom, in the absence of Gen. Grant or Meade, the command of the army fell, was fully alive to the importance of so doing, and he had the night before instructed his division officers, Gen. Birney and Gibbon, that all such ground between their positions and the Appomattox should be attacked and taken at or before daylight. (13) These instructions

13. Hancock: Report of the Fifth Epoch of the Campaign of 1864.

Write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed you without cost.

TO GENERAL LAW PENSIONERS DRAWING LESS THAN \$12.

If under the law of June 27, 1890, as construed by the New "AGE" Order, which is given elsewhere, a pensioner will receive an increase, he should write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed him without cost.

TO PENSIONERS UNDER THE ACT OF JUNE 27, 1890, WHO ARE RECEIVING LESS THAN \$12 PER MONTH.

Read very carefully the new "AGE" Order given in another column. If it allows you more pension than you are now receiving, write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed you without cost.

TO REJECTED CLAIMANTS.

Any one over 62 years of age whose claim, under any law, was rejected should write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed him without cost.

TO THOSE WISHING TO ALLEGE MORE DISABILITY THAN IS PRESUMED BY THE "AGE" ORDER.

The "AGE" Order presumes and allows that a claimant is half disabled for manual labor at the age of 62; two-thirds disabled at the age of 65; five-sixths disabled at the age of 68, and wholly disabled at the age of 70. If the claimant can not show that he has greater disability at these respective ages than is recited above, it is of no use for him to describe his ailments. It is a disadvantage, in fact, because it will incur the expense and delay of medical examination. If a claimant is in fair health for his age, it is useless to apply for more than is allowed by the "age" order.

Any one, however, who is sure that he is more disabled than is allowed for by the "AGE" Order should write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed him without cost.

OTHER CLASSES OF CLAIMS.

We are prepared to prosecute all kinds of claims other than those already referred to. Write us briefly about them.

ADDRESS.

Do not write long letters, and address answers and all correspondence to R. W. Shoppell, or THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, 339 Penn. Ave., Washington, D. C.

Widows.

Upon the death of your soldier husband, apply for pension promptly. It is one of the provisions he leaves for your maintenance. In most cases the pension will commence from date of application. Something is lost by delay. Write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed you without cost.

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14. Among these dominating points was the high ground at the position which will be found marked on the accompanying map as the "Avery House." Here there were a large redoubt and rifle-trenches that had been empty early in the morning; but these were greatly strengthened in the afternoon, and the delay permitted the Confederates soon to occupy it. It should be mentioned, however, that when an advance was at length made in the morning, Egan's Brigade of Birney's Division attacked and carried in a very spirited manner a small redoubt occupied by the enemy opposite Birney's left.

15. The enemy succeeded in holding this temporary line until the completion of the line on Cemetery Hill. When Hancock advanced the next day, the Confederates retired over "Hart's Hill."

(Continued on second page.)